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Legislative Deals and Statutory Bequests
Daniel A. Farber*
Until recently, the subject of statutory interpretation was a
forgotten backwater of legal scholarship.' Today, however, it
has become an exciting and rapidly growing body of scholar-
ship.2 Much of the credit goes to three former law professors
from the University of Chicago: Antonin Scalia, Richard Pos-
ner, and Frank Easterbrook. Their innovative writings have
sparked intense scholarly debate about subjects such as the le-
gitimacy of legislative history and the role of precedent in stat-
utory interpretation. In debating these issues, scholars have
brought to bear an impressive variety of intellectual tools, in-
cluding the theory of public choice and philosophical theories of
language.
Oddly enough, however, scholars of statutory interpreta-
tion haven't given much attention to the interpretation of other
legal instruments like contracts, wills, and deeds. Some writers
assume that the same method of interpretation should apply to
all texts, or at least to all legal texts. These writers sometimes
refer to private law in the course of discussions of public law
interpretation.3 For example, Judge Robert Bork recently at-
tacked the Supreme Court for using methods of constitutional
* Henry J. Fletcher Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. I would
like to thank Phil Frickey, Jason Johnston, Doug Winthrop, and Nick Zeppos
for their helpful comments.
1. See Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist Statutes and the New
Legal Process, 35 STAN. L. REV. 213, 213 (1983) ("nothing else as important in
the law receives so little attention" as statutory interpretation).
2. This scholarship, along with most of the leading cases, is brought to-
gether in chapter seven of W. ESKRIDGE & P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
Rather than burden this Essay with heavy footnoting, I would simply refer the
reader in search of further enlightenment to the Eskridge and Frickey book.
Readers specifically interested in economic models of interpretation should see
D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUC-
TION ch. 4 (1991). Because of the availability of the latter book, I will forego
the pleasure of peppering the Essay with citations to my own previous articles.
3. I assume that most readers have a general idea of what I mean by re-
ferring to public and private law. Making this distinction at all precise turns
out to be surprisingly difficult. See Farber & Frickey, In the Shadow of the
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interpretation that would be absurd if applied to a will. He
asks the reader to consider a will that leaves the bulk of the
estate to the testator's nephew, with some specific charitable
bequests. The judge then gives the whole estate to the judge's
own favorite charities, in order to effectuate the testator's gen-
eral charitable impulses. "No one would think for a moment
that the judge was interpreting," Bork says, "[y]et that is what
the Supreme Court has often done with the Constitution. '4
Another effort to connect public and private law is Frank
Easterbrook's discussion of statutes as "deals" that the courts
ought to enforce like contracts.5 Unfortunately, he assumes
that it is clear how contracts of this kind would (or should) be
enforced. Like Bork, he takes the private law end of the anal-
ogy for granted, without much thought about the functional re-
semblances and differences between statutes and contracts.
Apart from these relatively offhand references, discussions
of interpretation in public law rarely refer to such documents
as wills or contracts. One reason is undoubtedly scholarly spe-
cialization. Few constitutional law or legislation scholars teach
courses like property or contracts; of those few, most probably
regard these courses as pedagogical chores rather than poten-
tial sources of inspiration. Because private law is not a subject
of much interest to most public law scholars, there has been lit-
tle cross-fertilization.
This Essay is a tentative effort to think about interpreta-
tion in public and private law in a somewhat more systematic
way. My plan of attack is to examine interpretation problems
in some private law settings and then identify public law analo-
gies. I will limit myself to the simplest kind of interpretation
Legislature: The Common Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 92 MICH. L.
REv. - (1991) (forthcoming).
4. For Bork aficionados, here is the full quotation:
The Constitution is law. Like all law it is expressed in language.
Language has meaning. Judges who depart from any plausible mean-
ing of the language are not interpreting, they are legislating. Imagine
that a judge reads a will that leaves the bulk of the deceased's estate
to his nephew but makes specific bequests to a number of charities. If
the judge then says that the will discloses a generalized concern for
charity and so the nephew's share will go to other charities favored by
the judge, nobody would think for a moment that the judge was inter-
preting. Yet that is what the Supreme Court has often done with the
Constitution.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 29, 1990, at A21, col. 2.
5. This view of statutes pervades Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983




problem: that in which the drafters had a particular situation
in mind and adopted language addressing it, so that the inter-
pretation problem is caused only by an ambiguous or vague
text.
This limitation leaves out of consideration a host of more
complex problems that arise when the parties: (a) had an un-
derstanding but failed to incorporate it into the text; (b) consid-
ered a problem but failed to agree; (c) did not foresee changed
circumstances; or (d) simply failed to consider a possible situa-
tion.6 I have suggested elsewhere that the private law solutions
to some of these problems - for example, the treatment of
trade usage in the Uniform Commercial Code and the use of cy
pres to deal with changed circumstances in trusts - do have
some useful implications for public law.7 For today, however, I
will stick to the simplest situation, in which interpretation can
be understood simply as an effort to find the intended meaning
of the text.
'I am also going to glide past an important normative ques-
tion. Private law is largely dedicated to facilitating private or-
dering, so that people can enter into beneficial transactions.
Thus, the law of wills is primarily designed to provide reliable
mechanisms for transferring property, and contract law does
the same for market exchanges. Depending on what we think
of legislators, we might or might not want to design interpreta-
tive rules that will further their purposes. Jon Macey has ar-
gued, for example, that many statutes are the nefarious product
of special interest politics, which statutory interpretation
should try to frustrate rather than promote." The attractive-
ness of his thesis depends largely on the accuracy of this view
of legislatures, a subject I have discussed elsewhere but will not
pursue here.9 For quite other reasons, William Eskridge has ar-
gued that courts should apply the public values of their own
6. For an excellent recent discussion in the private law context, see Ay-
res & Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
7. See Farber, The "Unwritten Constitution" and the U.C.C., 6 CONST.
CoMMENTARY 217, 217-21 (1989); see also C. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS
REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 150 (1990) (analogizing
canons of statutory interpretation to contract law's gap-filling values).
8. See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statu-
tory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 224-27,
250-56 (1986).
9. See D. Farber & P. Frickey, supra note 2, ch. 1.
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time in interpreting statutes,10 and this argument I also set
aside for the present.
Instead, I will adopt the analytic tack common in analyses
of private law issues, and use economics to determine what
legal rules best further the interests of the transactors. I do not
purport to offer anything like a complete analysis of either my
private law analogies or of the legislative process. This is an
avowedly heuristic effort to identify some useful analogies, not
an effort at rigorous economic analysis.
I consider four models in this Essay, two involving con-
tracts and two for wills.11 In connection with these models, I
will consider three currently controversial issues: whether
courts should consider extrinsic evidence (legislative history);
whether agency interpretations are entitled to deference; and
whether stare decisis should apply in statutory cases.'2 These
are complex issues in their own right, but I believe that the pri-
vate law analogies shed some additional light on these current
debates in public law.
The concluding section of the Essay discusses how this sort
of analysis might be developed further. The private law models
are quite crude and could be improved in some obvious ways.
The kind of economic analysis used here may fit some kinds of
statutes better than others. Where the analysis does work, dif-
ferent private law models will fit different statutes. We may
need several approaches to statutory interpretation, depending
on the kind of statute involved.
Apart from the specifics of the models and their applica-
tions, this Essay suggests that analysis of statutory interpreta-
tion has been both too specific and too general. On the one
hand, it has been too specific by focusing almost exclusively on
statutes and failing to consider possible analogies to other kinds
of legal transactions. On the other hand, it has been too inat-
tentive to the distinctions between different types of statutes
10. See, e.g., Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1007, 1092-94 (1989).
11. Lest the mathophobic be frightened away by the reference to models,
I should add that I don't mean "models" in the sense of differential equations
or complicated graphs, I mean something closer to "models" in the sense of
"cheap plastic imitations of real objects."
12. For recent and more systematic treatment of these issues, the reader
should consult Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295,
1298-1335 (1990); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 444-46 (1989) (discussing literature on Chevron); Eskridge,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1363-84 (1988).
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that might suggest the use of different interpretative
techniques.
I hope that this Essay will advance scholarly efforts to ana-
lyze legislation issues. In addition, the models presented here
have at least some pedagogic use, since they invoke more easily
understood private law analogues to public law problems. Fi-
nally, their very crudeness may inspire others to a more rigor-
ous economic analysis of private law interpretation.
I. TESTAMENTARY MODELS FOR STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
The first two models involve seemingly simple testamen-
tary goals. The most important fact about testators is, of
course, that they are dead when the will goes into effect.13 The
testamentary analogy is most appropriate when a statute's
drafters are, as a practical matter, "out of the loop" once the
statute is passed. To the extent they can readily amend a stat-
ute or influence its interpretation (for instance, by using the
appropriations process to pressure an administrative agency),
the testamentary analogy is potentially misleading. But some
statutes, at least, seem to be one-shot efforts with little oppor-
tunity for later intervention.
A. MODEL 1: "THE CASE OF THE PARTITIONING PARENT"
Suppose that Ralph Rawls (a cousin of the Harvard philos-
opher) wants to allocate property between his two adult chil-
dren, Alan and Betty. It is important to Ralph that the two
receive equal shares of the property. Implausibly, we might as-
sume that he has read his cousin's egalitarian philosophy.14
More plausibly, he may want both his children and the outside
world to perceive him as making a fair division of the property.
Or perhaps he doesn't care about his ungrateful children ("they
never write!"), but feels a religious duty to give them equal
shares of the estate. The important thing is that he is con-
cerned with equalizing the amount of their bequests, not with
equalizing their ultimate welfare. (The importance of this dis-
tinction will become clear when we discuss Model 2.)
On its face, arranging an equal division of property seems
straightforward, but for our purposes it is important that the
13. Even the most zealous law review editor will not, I suppose, require
citation of authority in support of this assertion.
14. J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
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testator face some kind of uncertainty. Let's assume that the
estate will contain a large amount of cash as well as a valuable
collection of paintings, and that Ralph wants the paintings to
stay in the family. He is confident that Alan would keep the
paintings, but some additional cash will be necessary to equalize
the bequests. Just for the sake of specificity, assume that
Ralph has $500,000 in cash and guesses that the paintings are
worth about $300,000. He might leave the paintings plus
$100,000 to Alan, giving the remaining cash to Betty. He runs
the risk, however, of being wrong about the value of the paint-
ings, making the bequests unequal. He can reduce the uncer-
tainty by hiring an expert to appraise the paintings (and he can
reduce it even more by hiring more experts). Ralph's difficulty
is functionally equivalent to a drafting problem. He has a
choice: he can either spend more money on expert assistance
and obtain greater certainty about achieving his goals, or he can
save the money but take a greater risk.
For a quantitative analysis of Ralph's problem, we would
need more information. We would need to know how much ap-
praisers cost, and the degree of certainty associated with their
reports. We would also need to know just how much Ralph
cares about equalizing the bequests. (For example, how much
would he be willing to pay to ensure that the two bequests have
values differing by no more than $5,000?) We could then easily
determine the optimum amount for Ralph to spend on apprais-
als. Essentially, he should pay for appraisals until their margi-
nal information value to him is just equal to their marginal
cost.
For present purposes, the important point is more basic.
From Ralph's perspective, mistakes might go in either of two
directions: Either child could mistakenly get a larger bequest
than the other. Any deviation from Ralph's preferred outcome
(equal bequests) is undesirable from his perspective. Hence,
the possibilities of mistakes in opposite directions don't cancel
each other out. For example, the possibility that Alan will
sometimes get more than half doesn't offset the possibility that
he will sometimes get less.
This has important consequences for how Ralph thinks
about uncertainty. Suppose that Ralph was offered a different
estate plan, which gave each child an equal chance of getting
the whole estate. The "expected value" of each child's share is
$400,000,1' just what Ralph wants. But from Ralph's point of
15. Each child has a 50% chance of getting $800,000 and a 50% chance of
[Vol. 75:667
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view, this alternative is clearly worse than an estate plan guar-
anteeing each child a bequest of $400,000 - and this is true
whether Ralph is neutral toward gambling, shuns it like the
plague, or craves the bright lights of Las Vegas. What econo-
mists call risk aversion has nothing to do with this. The alter-
nate estate plan offers two possible outcomes (depending on
which child gets the whole estate). Since each uncertain out-
come is less preferred than the equal split, a "lottery" between
the two is also less preferred, regardless of risk aversion.16 For
this reason, Ralph has a strongly negative attitude toward un-
certainty. Consequently, he may find it worthwhile to invest in
expert assistance in order to decrease that uncertainty.
Ralph actually has a choice about how to make that invest-
ment. He could hire appraisers now and use their information
to allocate the cash between his children. This may be a good
strategy if the value of the paintings is relatively constant. If
their value fluctuates, however, it may be better to instruct the
executors to obtain appraisals of the paintings as of the date of
death and then divide the cash accordingly. Making an ap-
praisal at the time of death is something like interpreting a
statute: by being more careful, you can come closer to the
drafter's wishes.
The distinctive features of this model are that Ralph does
not plan to have a continuing oversight role' 7 and that errors in
opposite directions are not even partially off-setting. As a re-
sult, he has a strong desire for accurate implementation of his
directives.'8
The analogues in the statutory world are usually politically
uncontroversial - the sorts of statutes that establish rules of
appellate procedure, specify requirements for filing deeds, and
getting nothing. If you ran a whole series of such gambles, the average payout
to each child would be $400,000.
16. Which would you rather have, $10 or the following gamble: a 50%
chance of winning $9 and a 50% chance of winning $8? (If you prefer the lat-
ter, please give me a call; some of my colleagues would like to engage you in a
friendly game of poker.) To be attractive, a gamble has to offer some chance
of profit; even an addicted gambler is unlikely to make a bet which is a certain
loss. Either of the two outcomes in the alternate estate plan, however, is
worse than the alternative of not gambling and sticking with the guaranteed
even split.
17. Or at least, if he does plan to keep on eye on things, he'll have to rely
on a Ouija board to communicate his views from the Great Beyond.
18." Ralph is much like Posner's hypothetical platoon commander in this
respect. R. POSNER, THE PROBLEM OF JURISPRUDENCE 269 (1990). Indeed,
Model 1 is a close analogy to Posner's hypothetical.
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establish contract rules between merchants. They tend to be
uncontroversial because they are aimed at improving efficiency
without favoring any particular group in an obvious way.19 Be-
cause of the lack of interest-group involvement, they will only
sporadically make their way back onto the legislat agenda.
(This doesn't mean that the supporters of the original legisla-
tion lack interest in its effects. They may feel strongly about
the issue, but they realize that their ability to legislative on the
issue is due to fortuitous circumstances; they cannot expect the
details of implementation are likely to attract much attention
from their successors.) Consequently, continuing legislative
oversight is unlikely. Also, errors in application are cumulative
rather than offsetting. For example, the legislature might es-
tablish a filing system to provide an efficient method of track-
ing land titles. If the court erroneously gives effect to an
unrecorded deed, the problem is only compounded if in another
case the same court mistakenly holds a properly recorded deed
to be ineffective. The two kinds of mistake simply do not "av-
erage out."
The testamentary model suggests that judicial interpreta-
tion of such statutes should place a heavy value on correctness,
so that countervailing values such as stare decisis should count
for less. It also suggests that use of legislative history to deter-
mine the statute's goal is appropriate because it allows the
court to implement the legislature's wishes more precisely at
relatively modest expense.20 At the drafting stage, it is no sur-
prise to find that, just as Ralph has an incentive to invest in the
use of. appraisers, the legislature often turns to experts to draft
documents such as procedural laws and commercial codes.
B. MODEL 2: "THE CASE OF THE UTILITARIAN UNCLE"
Our next model also involves a bequest. Benny Bentham
(a distant relative of the utilitarian philosopher), wishes to pro-
vide for his two teenage nieces, Alice and Bernice. Like Ralph,
he has an $800,000 estate. Unlike Ralph, however, he isn't con-
19. Another analogy might be to statutory provisions conferring financial
benefits on interest groups (e.g., tax exemptions). The legislature might want
the group to get the benefit of the statute but to have to return to Congress in
order to get any more.
20. Notably, courts allow the use of extrinsic evidence to construe ambig-
uous language in wills, and even, to an increasing extent, to overcome clear
language in cases of mistake. See Langbein & Waggoner, Reformnation of
Wills on the Ground of Mistake: Change of Direction in American Law?, 130
U. PA. L. REv. 521, 521-22, 530-35 (1982).
[Vol. 75:667
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cerned with equalizing the sizes of the bequests. Instead, he
wants to equalize the welfare of the two children as they are
growing up, so he plans to give them each an income interest
from a trust until they are of age. Like his famous ancestor, he
believes that their utilities can be reliably determined; he
doesn't buy the modern economist's skepticism about intersub-
jective comparison of utility.21
Because Ralph and Benny both want to provide for their
legatees equally, they might seem to face rather similar
problems. But Benny's situation differs in an important way
from Ralph's. Benny isn't just concerned with how much
money the two kids get. He's also concerned with their needs.
These are difficult to predict, and Benny doesn't expect to be
around while his nieces are growing up. Hence, he's in a bad
position to determine their proper shares. He could specify an
even split of the trust income, but he would be taking the
chance that changed circumstances would disadvantage one of
the nieces. For instance, one of them might need expensive
medical care or special schooling, or one's family might become
more affluent than the other's. He might attempt to provide
for all of these contingencies through elaborate drafting. This
may be difficult and expensive, and quite possibly ineffective.
The obvious alternative is to delegate the task to a reliable
trustee,22 perhaps providing some guidance about what factors
the trustee should consider. On the benefit side, the trustee
will be in a position to consider new information as it develops.
Naturally, there are also some costs to entrusting this discre-
tion to the trustee. The trustee may make mistakes, conceiva-
bly serious ones. It may be difficult to pick a trustee who will
make such discretionary decisions wisely. Also, the trustee
may have to be compensated for this potentially time-consum-
ing task.
Benny's attitude toward risk differs in an interesting way
from Ralph's. From Ralph's point of view, mistakes are serious
because any deviation from his preferred outcome is an unam-
biguous loss. From Benny's perspective, mistakes by the
trustee have a partially redeeming character: if the trustee
makes a mistake and gives too little to one niece, he will give
the excess to the other niece, increasing her utility, so it's not a
21. See J. HiRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 62-63 (1984).




total loss. The extent of this offset is hard to assess without
more precise information about Benny's preferences.
If we were to attempt a formal model of this situation, we
would have to think quite carefully about how Benny's prefer-
ences relate to those of his nieces. An economist could assign
them utility functions based on their own preferences, as re-
vealed by the choices they would make between different con-
sumption options. But Benny probably has different
preferences about their choices than they do themselves. Being
an old fogey rather than a teenager, Benny is likely to think
that they have too short a time horizon and too little risk aver-
sion. His own preference function simply will not incorporate
the current preferences of the two nieces.
If Benny does decide to delegate the ongoing division of the
income, he obviously wants the decisionmaker to be a neutral
party without a bias in favor of either niece. For example, he
will not want to appoint the parents of one niece to the posi-
tion. He also will want to ensure that the nieces cannot offer
strategic incentives to the decisionmaker. The law of trusts
comes to his assistance with strict rules about conflicts of inter-
ests by fiduciaries. A legislature, similarly, might wish to en-
sure the neutrality of its interpretative agent. In this setting,
the article III guarantee of life tenure for federal judges may
serve the same function as the traditional restrictions on
fiduciaries.
The obvious analogies here are to the so-called "common
law" statutes - those that establish some general standard and
leave to the courts the task of fleshing out the standard's mean-
ing. The Sherman Act23 is the classic example. Unable to spec-
ify all of the actions that might be anti-competitive in some
future situation, Congress left it to the courts to define the con-
tours of the laws. In this setting, the courts play the same role
as the trustees of a testamentary trust.
This model sheds some light on the role of stare decisis in
common law statutes. Precedents under statutes such as the
Sherman Act carry a weight akin to that of common law prece-
dents, so that there is no "super-strong" rule of stare decisis as
there is in other statutory settings. This makes good sense in
terms of the trust analogy. Benny's reason for using a trustee
is that judgments need to be made on the spot to take account
of changing circumstances. The trustee should not be required
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
[Vol. 75:667
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to divide the trust income the same this year as she did last
year - if Benny had wanted a static division, he could have es-
tablished the allocation himself. So Benny would not want the
trustee to view last year's allocation as a completely binding
"precedent." At the same time, the beneficiaries would suffer
if their incomes fluctuated wildly and unpredictably, so the
trustee should take account of their interest in stability. As a
result, we would expect the trustee to give some weight to sta-
bility but to change the allocation when clearly warranted by
new information or changed circumstances. The approach to
precedent in Sherman Act cases seems strikingly similar.
So far, we have been thinking in terms of a testamentary
trust, on the assumption that the legislation is a one-shot effort.
Suppose, however, legislators expect to engage in ongoing su-
pervision of the interpretative process. The coalition behind
the law may expect to be a durable majority or at least to con-
trol the relevant committees. (Note that I am treating the ma-
jority coalition, rather than Congress as an institution, as the
testator.) Here, the better analogy might be the inter vivos.
trust. If Benny expects the trust to operate while he is still
around to keep an eye on things, he is likely to want to reserve
some control over the trustee's exercise of discretion. Benny
may retain the power to modify the trust, replace the trustee,
or even disapprove individual decisions by the trustee. He still
will want the trustee to be insulated from direct pressure from
the beneficiaries. (If they are going to try to influence some-
one, he'd rather they give their attention to him.) Similarly, an
ongoing legislative coalition might favor a delegation to an in-
dependent agency, because agencies (even if they are theoreti-
cally under presidential control) are strongly influenced by
congressional oversight and budget control. The independent
agency might be preferred over a court because it is more ame-
nable to legislative control while still retaining some insulation
from direct political influence by the regulated parties.
- If this analogy holds, we would expect the attitude of re-
viewing courts toward agencies to be something like that of
judges toward trustees. In trust law, the trustee's exercise of
discretion is subject to a lenient standard of review, and will be
set aside only for bad faith or some other abuse of discretion.
The court's primary role is to ensure that the trustee actually is
making a good faith effort to follow her instructions and is act-
ing within the scope of her discretion. More intensive judicial
review would make little sense - Benny chose the trustee, not
1991]
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the judge, to make the discretionary decision about how best to
implement Benny's purpose.
In administrative law, courts are similarly reluctant to
overturn the interpretations of administrative agencies. In
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,24 the Court strongly endorsed the role of agencies in statu-
tory interpretation. If the statute does not clearly address an
issue, under Chevron judges must defer to the administrative
construction.25 The Chevron rule is based on the premise that
Congress delegated policymaking discretion to the agency
rather than the courts. The resemblance between the Chevron
rule and trust law seems unmistakable. Although the precise
contours of the Chevron rule are debatable, its basic rationale is
well-supported by this private-law analogy.
II. CONTRACTUAL MODELS
At this point, we switch from Trusts & Estates to Con-
tracts. Economics is better geared to modeling market transac-
tions than testamentary dispositions,26 so this switch brings
with it some modeling advantages.
I am going to abstract away from one extremely important
aspect of contract law involving the dynamics of renegotiation.
The possibility of strategic breach or threats to breach is an im-
portant factor in contract law. Although statutes may in some
sense be "deals," they do not share this feature. Legislators
cannot breach a statute in the way that businesses breach a
contract. Legislators can, of course, breach various side-agree-
ments, such as logrolling deals. But they don't have the option
of violating a statute and risking a damage payment to other
legislators. Because they can't threaten to unilaterally halt per-
formance of the statute, the dynamics of renegotiation are also
quite different. To exclude this factor from the model, I will
focus on contracts in which the only issue is dividing the profits
from an enterprise. I will simply assume, rather arbitrarily,
that the parties will not seek to better their situations through
opportunistic conduct during the performance of the contract.
Despite this important distinction between contracts and
statutes, contract models capture an important aspect of statu-
tory interpretation that is missing from the testamentary mod-
24. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
25. Id. at 844-45.
26. For example, it isn't clear what discount rate a rational testator would
use for post-mortem events.
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els. A will typically reflects the preferences of a single
individual.2 A contract, however, is an arrangement by two
parties whose preferences differ and whose interests are par-
tially conflicting. Many statutes are the result of coalitions be-
tween legislators of differing views, and are therefore more like
contracts than wills. The two contractual models attempt to il-
luminate this aspect of legislation.
A. MODEL 3: "THE CASE OF THE CORPORATE COMPROMISE"
This model involves a dispute between two publicly held
corporations. For the sake of concreteness, let's say they are
called the Peach Computer Company and Moon Computers,
Inc. Peach claims that certain basic design features of Moon's
machines infringe on Peach's patents. Because Peach's claims
are fairly strong, the companies agree to a settlement giving
Peach a 50% share of Moon's profits. The crucial drafting prob-
lem is defining the term "profits." The drafters might choose
to draft a very specific but highly complex set of accounting
rules. Another choice is to leave the term vague, allowing its
meaning to be settled during the performance of the contract
or, if necessary, through arbitration. Another option is to re-
quire profits to be determined by reference to standard ac-
counting practices, which may change over the course of the
contract. In deciding whether to hammer out a specific contrac-
tual definition or adopt one of the other alternatives, the par-
ties must consider the possibility that a more dynamic
alternative will ultimately result in an interpretation adverse to
their interests.
Superficially, their problem seems rather similar to that of
Ralph Rawls, our testator in Model 1. Like Ralph, they wish to
arrange an even division of property but have a definitional
problem. It is tempting to assume that, like Ralph, they place a
great deal of value on certainty and have a strong interest in
avoiding the risk of an uneven division. Actually, though, their
situation is quite different.
From Ralph's point of view, any deviation from equality is
undesirable, regardless of whom it favors. But this is not true
of Moon and Peach. Any mistake that harms one will thereby
favor the other. If the contract is properly drafted, the possible
mistakes will be offsetting.
27. This may not be true of a joint will by two spouses or where there is a
will contract, but even there the preferences of the spouses at the time of
drafting presumably are likely to be largely congruent.
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The parties may anticipate a bias on the part of the even-
tual interpreter, perhaps based on sympathy with one of the
parties. As long as this possible bias is known to both parties,
however, it is irrelevant to drafting the definition of "profits."
Suppose, for example, that a future court is likely to be biased
in favor of Peach, or that the accounting conventions are likely
to shift in Peach's favor. In either case, Moon's expected share
of the profits is less than the nominal 50%. If the balance of
bargaining power between the parties dictates a 50-50 split, as
we are assuming, Moon can bargain for a nominal figure in ex-
cess of 50%, so that its expected share will be brought up to
50%. At this new figure, errors are just as likely to push Moon
below an actual share of 50% as above it. Having a biased deci-
sionmaker is like having a watch that is always five minutes
late: so long as the error is known, it can be compensated for
readily.
Conceivably, the parties might disagree about the existence
of a possible bias, or they might be concerned about how unso-
phisticated outsiders will view their deal.28 But at least as a
first approximation, it seems reasonable to assume that the rel-
evant parties are sophisticated and fully informed about possi-
ble biases. Therefore, we can assume that the nominal terms
are set so as to cancel out any predictable bias in
interpretation.29
Consequently, in this model, we can assume that the par-
ties anticipate that, on average, each will get half of the profits,
despite any possible interpretational errors. They are each still
taking the chance, however, that they actually will get less than
half. In short, they still face a risk of misinterpretation, and
one might think they have a strong interest in avoiding that
risk. There is a good basis, however, for thinking that they
should be fairly indifferent to that risk.
The reason is that Moon and Peach are publicly held cor-
porations. By and large, their attitudes toward risk should re-
flect the interests of their shareholders. The shareholders
themselves are likely to be risk averse, but finance theory indi-
cates that they should seek to protect themselves against risk
by holding diversified portfolios, not by favoring risk-averse
28. For example, maybe Peach's shareholders will regard a split nomi-
nally favoring Moon as a big defeat, not understanding that the real split is
more even.
29. This assumes that while the courts are biased in their interpretations,
they are not willing simply to mandate (perhaps covertly) a predetermined
split regardless of the language of the contract.
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management of the companies. So we should expect the corpo-
rations themselves to behave in a risk-neutral fashion.30 This
means that the corporations should make decisions based on
expected returns rather than the spread of possible returns.
That is, corporations should be neutral between a guaranteed
return of $1 million and a 50% chance of making $2 million.
On average, the gamble will pay off $1 million, and this should
be the corporation's only concern. In Model 3, Peach and Moon
know that their expected percentage of profits will be 50%; the
uncertainty on both sides of this figure caused by possible inter-
pretational errors should be a matter of relative indifference.
This has some surprising implications for drafting. Essen-
tially, the corporations have very little reason to eliminate in-
terpretation errors, and therefore little reason to desire a
detailed, comprehensive contract. Thus, their basic inclination
should be to settle on very vague terms, taking the risk that the
later interpretation of the contract will favor one party or the
other. Their strongest reason to care about specificity relates to
transaction costs; it may be easier to negotiate specific terms to
cover a contingency as part of an overall package rather than
bickering after the problem has materialized. Yet, much of the
drafting effort is likely to be wasted on terms designed to cover
situations that never actually happen.31 Even if it is worth ne-
gotiating specific terms immediately, the corporations won't
care about the precise terms so long as they work out to a fifty-
fifty split. Assuming Peach and Moon have equal confidence in
their lawyers, they will be willing to agree to the fifty-fifty split
and leave it to the lawyers to hammer out the details (taking
the risk that their own legal gladiators may do worse than
expected).
This model seems to account for an important - and to
lawyers, puzzling - aspect of business behavior, which is the
willingness to make important business deals "on a handshake"
without working out any of the terms that lawyers think are so
important. The reason is that specific terms have only secon-
30. For extensive discussion of the realism of this assumption, see Gil-
lette, Commercial Relationships and the Selection of Default Rules for Remote
Risks, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 535 (1990). In the situation in the text, the risk can
be eliminated simply by holding shares in both companies.
31. Also, if the future negotiating costs are the same as the present costs,
it is worthwhile to defer the expenditures because of the "time value of
money": a dollar spent today is equivalent to a greater amount tomorrow due
to the accrual of interest. See infra note 42.
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dary importance to the corporations because they affect risk
rather than expected return.
To the extent that a legislative "deal" looks like Model 3,
then, we would expect legislators to take little interest in inter-
pretative risks. They are likely to choose open-ended terms,
and where there are trade-offs between interpretative accuracy
and other costs, to place a lower value on interpretative accu-
racy. Thus, for instance, they are likely to prefer a cheap if less
accurate method of dispute resolution, such as arbitration, to
the possibly more accurate but cumbersome process of
litigation.
Some of the classic regulatory statutes may fit this model,
particularly if we accept the common view among economists
that these statutes were at least partly passed to benefit the
regulated industries themselves.32 For example, the Natural
Gas Act requires that pipelines charge a "reasonable" rate,
which could be seen as a compromise between pipelines and oil
producers.33 The existence of this open-ended standard fits
Model 3 rather well. In applying this standard, the agency
might err in either direction, and these errors are mutually off-
setting. Moreover, shareholders' risk aversion would not be a
serious problem. Because the Act only regulated one industry,
any risk can be neutralized by holding a diversified portfolio.
This model treats statutes and their interpretation as just
another set of events impacting on a business, so that an unex-
pected action by Congress or the courts is viewed by the busi-
ness in just the same ways as an unexpected movement in
exchange rates or oil prices. Legal scholars, of course, treat one
set of events as involving mere fortuities while the others in-
volve issues of principle, and perhaps business people occasion-
ally feel the same way. Ultimately, however, it is the bottom
line that matters in business.
One might think, as Judge Easterbrook has said, that legis-
lators would place little weight on stare decisis. Deals, as he
points out, must be kept to be believed, and stare decisis allows
the deal to be changed as the result of an interpretation error.3
Actually, however, it is much less clear in Model 3 that stare
decisis is disfavored.
32. For a summary of the literature, see D. FARBER & P. FRICKEY, supra
note 2, ch. 1.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (1988).
34. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 Cor-
NELL L. REV. 422, 429 (1988).
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Because interpretative errors can be expected to average
out, the supporters of such legislation would give little weight
to interpretative accuracy as opposed to other factors. As we
have seen, this may lead them to draft open-ended statutes in
order to avoid complex negotiations over the particular terms.
It also will lead them to favor strong stare decisis rules. Insta-
bility of legal rules involves inevitable transaction costs (such
as greater litigation).35 At the time of enactment, because a fu-
ture mistaken interpretation of the statute is as likely to favor
one side as the other, the framers of the statute would place a
greater weight on eliminating these transaction costs than on
avoiding interpretation errors. Thus, one would expect a strong
presumption in favor of stare decisis.
For similar reasons, the framers have little reason to favor
the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret their bargain. Refer-
ence to extrinsic evidence creates two kinds of expenses:
higher lawyering costs at the time of the litigation, and higher
lobbying costs at the time of enactment (as the parties struggle
to create favorable legislative history). On average, the mis-
takes cancel out anyway, so it isn't worthwhile to incur these
transaction costs in the hope of a more accurate interpretation
of the statute.
B. MODEL 4: "THE CASE OF THE SEPARATING SPOUSES"
The conclusions in Model 3 are shaped heavily by the risk
neutrality of the corporations entering into the contract. Sup-
pose instead that we have a divorce settlement between two
35. The existence of a stare decisis rule makes the outcome of the first
case involving a novel issue more important, since it will control future out-
comes. Thus, the parties will invest more in litigating that case than they
would in the absence of a stare decisis rule. But unless the optimum legal in-
vestment in a case is a linear function of the stakes, the increased initial fee
will still represent a cost saving compared with the expense of repeated litiga-
tion. The non-linearity assumption means that if it is worth spending $100,000
to litigate a $1 million case, it only is worth spending some amount less than
$10 million to litigate a $100 million case, given cases of equal legal and factual
complexity. This assumption seems reasonable. It seems unlikely that, for ex-
ample, that doubling the number of lawyers working on a brief will have a
proportionate effect on the expected outcome of the case. The realism of this
assumption is supported by the fact that people with multiple litigation find it
worthwhile to set up test cases to govern the outcomes of all these cases. In
other words, parties who are not risk averse find it worthwhile to use the first
case on an issue as a test case to decide the legal issue, rather than relitigating
the legal issue repeatedly.
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risk-averse individuals, George and Martha.36 As in the previ-
ous model, let's say that the settlement will take the form of a
half share of a business - in this instance, we might say that
George runs a small business. Again, the problem is that the
term "profit" is not easily defined and may be subject to later
dispute.37
Because the parties are risk averse, their attitude toward
uncertainty is much different from that of the corporations in
Model 3. The fact that the corporations can each expect half
the profits means that the possible adverse outcomes are bal-
anced by the possible favorable ones. But for the risk-averse
person, the risk of losing money weighs more heavily than the
equal chance of winning the same amount of money. As a con-
sequence, unlike the corporations in Model 3, George and
Martha have a strong incentive to narrow their risks by sharp-
ening the definition of profits in the contract. Thus, in Model 4,
the parties place a higher value on clarity than in Model 3.
Firms are usually risk neutral, while individuals are not.
Hence, Model 4 best fits statutes that resolve important con-
flicting interests between groups of individuals. Title VII, the
federal employment discrimination statute,38 contains a nice an-
alogue to Model 4. Because of the central economic importance
of employment for most people, employment-related risks are
often large and not easily diversifiable. Hence, a dispute be-
tween two groups over the right to certain jobs comes close to
Model 4. Just such a conflict is present in Title VII, and in or-
der to pass the statute it was necessary for civil rights advocates
to strike a deal with union leaders to protect seniority rights.39
Courts have made a strong effort to stay close to the original
bargain, even at the expense of the overall purpose of Title
VII.40
36. A colleague suggested Homer and Marge Simpson as alternative
names.
37. To prevent the more obvious forms of shenanigans by George, let's say
that the business is carefully audited, so that he can't just hide the money.
Also, he's a workaholic and won't decrease his efforts because of the
settlement.
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (1988).
39. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
348-56 (1977) (reviewing the legislative history of Title VII relating to seniority
systems).
40. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2265 (1989);
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276-77 (1982); American Tobacco Co.
v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68-71 (1982); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 81-83 (1977).
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Model 4 also offers an opportunity to explore another in-
triguing, if difficult, issue about the temporal dimension of in-
terpretation. Assume that there are two definitional issues
regarding the profits from George's company, one of which will
change the amount of profits next year by $10,000, while the
other has the same impact on profits five years down the road.
(Perhaps one item, if allowable, will offset an income receipt
next year, whereas the other will go into the basis of an asset to
be sold in five years). Which one will the parties care the most
about?
The answer is, of course, the more immediate item. Future
amounts have to be reduced to present value through discount-
ing, so that the present value of the more immediate amount
will be greater.41 One way of seeing this is to observe that at a
10% interest rate, you would have to put $9,090 in the bank to-
day to have $10,000 in a year, but only $6,210 to have that
amount in five years.4 This is a $2,880 difference. Conversely,
by waiting five years for a payment, you forego all the interest
you could have earned in the meantime.
Indeed, risk aversion makes this effect even more pro-
nounced. Risk-averse investors add a risk premium to their in-
terest rate.43 As a result, the difference in present values will
be even greater. As an illustration, suppose they move from a
10% rate to a 15% rate because of risk aversion. Then the dif-
ference in present values goes from $2,800 to $3,730, and the
more immediate item weighs almost twice as strongly.44
Thus, given two otherwise identical gambles, 45 risk-averse
parties will be more concerned about the one that will arrive
soon, and care less about one in the distant future.46 Where the
41. For a good introductory treatment, see J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note
21, at 442-72.
42. See the table in R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRMNCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANCE 744 (1981).
43. I am assuming here and throughout this discussion that the risk is un-
diversifiable. Otherwise, George and Martha would just diversify their portfo-
lios and thereafter behave like the risk-neutral shareholders in Model 3.
44. At a 15% rate, the present value of $10,000 in one year is $8,700, while
the present value of $10,000 in five years is only $4,970. See the same table in
R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 42, at 744.
45. This is a crucial assumption. If the size of the "stakes" grows as fast
as the discount rate, future and present rights will weigh equally. This might
happen, for example, if a statute regulates a rapidly growing industry.
46. Another way to see this is to think about insurance premiums. Sup-
pose someone would be willing to pay a $100 insurance premium to cover a
10% chance of a $800 loss today. To make the arithmetic easy, let's assume a
5% discount for amounts one year in the future. How much would the same
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risks involve interpretation, they will care more about misinter-
pretations in the near future than about later misinterpreta-
tions. (Risk-neutral parties, on the other hand, don't care much
either way about the reliability of interpretations so long as
they can predict the average outcome.) This fits the common
intuition that drafters care much more about how a document
will be interpreted in the short-run than about long-term con-
sequences. Even opponents of originalism in constitutional law,
for example, usually concede that recent constitutional amend-
ments should be construed on the basis of original intent.47
Similarly, under Model 4, the enacting legislature would desire
that courts pay close attention to legislative history (despite
some higher transaction costs), particularly in the early years
of the statute's implementation. S
Model 4 also has interesting implications for stare decisis.
Looking ahead, risk-averse contractors can foresee the follow-
ing scenario. Somewhere down the road, the court may make a
mistake in interpretation. There will then follow a period of
uncertainty while everyone waits to see if the mistake is cor-
rected. This uncertainty will result in unavoidable transaction
costs (such as increased lawyering expenses of various kinds),
regardless of whether the court ever overrules itself. After
some further time period, the court may reverse itself.
Notice that the reversal is less likely and comes farther
down the road than the transaction costs. Because they are risk
averse, the parties will view the certainty of higher transaction
costs as relatively more important than the contingency of a
beneficial overruling - risk-averse people don't like to gamble.
Moreover, risk aversion means, as we have seen, the use of a
higher discount rate, so that the transaction costs also get a
higher weight because they will come sooner. For both reasons,
the parties will give the prospect of an overruling less relative
weight than the transaction costs. (And don't forget that each
party knows that the initial error may be in its own direction,
person be willing to pay today in order to cover this risk a year from now?
The present value of the possible loss is $760, so from a present value perspec-
tive, the individual faces a 10% chance of a $760 loss - in other words, the loss
has shrunk by 5%. The risk premium, however, should shrink by somewhat
more than 5% because risk aversion is not a linear function of loss: large
losses are proportionately more feared than small ones.
47. See, e.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understand-
ing, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204, 229 (1980).
48. We need to be careful in assigning discount rates to legislators. If they
are acting as agents for interest groups, it is the interest groups' discount rates
that count, not the legislator's personal time preferences.
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so that only half of the overrulings will be desirable from its
perspective.) The bottom line is that correcting interpretative
mistakes is less attractive than one might expect, even for the
risk-averse. Unless the mistake is a particularly serious one, so
that the benefits of correction loom large, risk-averse parties
would prefer to apply stare decisis. This means that, contrary
to Judge Easterbrook's suggestion, stare decisis may be some-
times favored even at the expense of fidelity to the original
"deal."49
Although both Models 3 and 4 support stare decisis rules,
they do so to different degrees. In Model 3, the corporations
have very little reason to care about the correctness of any par-
ticular legal interpretation, so long as they expect errors to av-
erage out. Hence, correcting erroneous interpretations is
simply not a matter that concerns the parties ex ante, and a
strong stare decisis rule is attractive. In Model 4, however, the
individuals do care ex ante about mistakes, even if they expect
errors to average out. This fact, taken alone, would incline
them toward giving no weight to precedent at all, but counter-
vailing factors exist relating to transaction costs and the time
value of money. Because of these countervailing factors, Model
4 leaves room for a stare decisis rule, but the binding effect of
precedents can be expected to be lower than in Model 3. So in
Model 3 we would expect a "super-strong" rule of stare decisis,
C but not in Model 4.
CONCLUSION
If I had a bevy of bright graduate students at my command,
49. This conclusion should be contrasted with Model 2, where stare decisis
carries less weight. A fifth model might blend aspects of Models 3 and 4. A
statute might represent a deal between parties with different discount rates or
different attitudes toward risk. For example, firms are generally thought to
use higher discount rates than individuals because of corporate-level taxes: in
order to give their individual shareholders their desired rate of return, the cor-
poration itself must earn a higher rate of return. See Baumol, On the Social
Rate of Discount, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 788, 793-96 (1968). A statute might well
be a compromise between industry interests and representatives of consumer
or taxpayer interests. Such a deal would probably give the industry benefits
up-front, with a longer payout period for the individuals. In the area of taxa-
tion, for example, this would mean long-term tax reforms, which benefit indi-
vidual taxpayers collectively, combined with favorable transition rules for
industries. When statutes combine a public interest provision with specific ex-
emptions for some firms, the optimum bargain for the parties places more
weight on the general interest side of the bargain as time goes on. Thus,
courts should give a broader interpretation to the public interest terms at the
expense of special interest proviso as the statute ages.
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I would send them off to improve the private-law models in
various ways. One of my goals would be to increase their ade-
oquacy as models of private law interpretation. I would direct
one group to formalize the models mathematically and add
plenty of intimidating references to convex hypersurfaces and
fixed-point theorems. Another group would be asked to aug-
ment the models by incorporating features such as post-con-
tracting strategic conduct or gap-filling issues.
My other assistants would try to deal with some of the lim-
itations of economics. One task force would try to come to
grips with some of the shortfalls of the economic theory under-
lying the models. For example, there is considerable evidence
that individuals are not rational in either their responses to
risks5° or their discount rates.51 It would be nice to know how
many of my conclusions would survive more realistic modeling.
I would ask a final group (maybe philosophy Ph.D students
rather than economists) to think about how the models them-
selves (and private law interpretation more generally) relate to
the non-economic theories of interpretation proposed by philos-
ophers and literary theorists.52 ARI of this would require, of
course, hefty research funding, which would free me to read
murder mysteries instead of teaching, while my grad students
slaved away at a series of articles under my name.
There is also a great deal of work to do on the public-law
side. The models all assume, rather naively, that the normativd
goal is to implement the desires of the enacting legislature. At
any one time, our society is involved in passing new statutes
and is subject to regulation under a variety of old ones. Pre-
sumably, the present members of society would like a set of in-
terpretative rules that responds to our preferences in both
capacities. The models in this Essay respond only to the first
set of preferences and do so imperfectly, because they essen-
tially assume that social preferences and legislative preferences
are identical. From the normative end of things, then, the mod-
els are far from definitive.
50. For a summary of this research, see Noll & Krier, Some Implications
of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 754-60
(1990).
51. Some observers have concluded that "[c]onsumers seem to assign en-
tirely whimsical values to money" - or more precisely, to the time value of
money. See Nickel-and-Dimed to Death, Wash. Post National Weekly Ed., Feb.
19-25, 1990, at 39, col. 1.
52. I would probably ask them to start with William Eskridge's
Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 609, 612-14 (1990).
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On the descriptive side, the models are also over-simplified.
Essentially, they assume that the enacting legislators either
share the same view of the ideal outcome (the testamentary sit-
uation), or else are split into two camps which are seeking to
reach a compromise (the contracting situation). But legisla-
tures can have other configurations. Notably, instead of being
split into two camps, the legislators may be spread out along a
spectrum. The median legislator may then determine the sub-
stance of the legislation. Because the legislation is close to that
legislator's ideal outcome, she is in something like the position
of the testator in Model 1. For her, errors in one direction are
as bad as errors in the other. But other legislators are ranged
on opposing sides of the issue, so from their perspective the sit-
uation looks something like the contracting model, in which the
outcome is a compromise between two opposing parties. It isn't
clear how an interpretation model should deal with the diverse
perspectives of these various legislators.53
In short, it seems to me that there is great room here for
additional research. If this Essay prompts some scholarship in
that direction, it will have served its purpose. But even the
crude models offered here, I believe, can illuminate issues of
statutory interpretation. I have also found the private law anal-
ogies useful in the classroom. For example, in a constitutional
law class where none of the students could see any argument
for originalism, Bork's analogy to will interpretation began to
give them a grasp of that perspective.
Perhaps the greatest lesson here, however, is how quickly
even simple private law models become complex. Interpreta-
tion looks different for wills than for contracts, and different
for contracts between corporations than contracts between indi-
viduals. If anything, the realm of legislation is much more
complex and untidy. Simply because of this complexity and
messiness, we are badly in need of the guidance that even a
rough theory can provide. But we will blunder badly if we for-
get how much our theories shortchange reality.
53. Other complications include the presence of "gatekeeping" commit-
tees and the possibility of a veto. For an attempt to include these within the
model, see Eskridge, Reneging on History? The Court/Congress/President
Civil Rights Game, 79 CALIF. L. REV. - (forthcoming) (1991).
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